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This paper estimates demand elasticities for the Turkish mobile telecommunication market. In 
contrast to most other studies, firm level data is used to estimate dynamic panel data models 
including instrumental variable techniques. Both short- and long-run elasticities are 
calculated, yielding a long-run price elasticity of -0.72 for the post-paid market and of -0.33 
for the pre-paid market. The short-run price elasticity is estimated to be -0.36 for the post-paid 
market and -0.20 for the pre-paid market. In addition, evidence of fixed to mobile traffic 
substitution is provided for consumers that use pre-paid cards. 
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1. Introduction 
The unsatisfactory performance of Turkey’s mobile telecommunications market has been 
documented and analysed by two recent contributions. Burnham (2007) and Atiyas and 
Dogan (2007) provided detailed qualitative studies of competition in the Turkish 
telecommunications industry and derived various policy recommendations for how to increase 
competition through regulatory reforms.  
In order to better understand the allocative efficiency gains from regulatory reforms it is 
crucial to have knowledge about demand elasticities (Manfrim & da Silva, 2007; Dewenter & 
Haucap, 2008). This paper therefore complements the two qualitative studies mentioned 
above by quantitative estimates of mobile demand elasticities in Turkey. To the best of the 
authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to conduct such a quantitative empirical analysis of 
the Turkish mobile telecommunications market.  
Quite generally, the magnitude of mobile telecommunications demand elasticities has also 
been the subject of debate in various hearings on price regulation and the allocation of 
common costs, for which demand elasticities play an important role (e.g., for Ramsey 
pricing). For example, most recently estimates of mobile demand elasticities have played a 
significant role in the debate about the regulation of mobile termination rates in New Zealand 
(New Zealand Commerce Commission, 2009). Similarly, the extent of fixed-to-mobile 
substitution has been a key issue for regulatory authorities when delineating markets for 
regulatory purposes (Briglauer, Schwarz, & Zulehner, 2010). 
 
As understanding demand elasticities has become important for a better regulation of mobile 
markets and the underlying cost-benefit-analyses, the number of studies that estimate demand 
elasticities has also been increasing, some of which are reviewed in section 2 of this paper. 
The present paper adds to this literature by providing estimates for demand elasticities in a 
highly concentrated market. In contrast to most other research the analysis presented in this 
paper uses firm level data for the estimates and does not have to retreat to country-level data, 
even though the data used covers 90% of all Turkish customers. Moreover, since dynamic 
panel techniques are applied, one can also distinguish between short-run and long-run demand 
elasticities for both pre-paid and post-paid customers. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2 the available empirical 
evidence on demand elasticities in mobile telecommunications markets is briefly reviewed   3
and the relationship between the approach used in this paper and the previous literature is 
discussed. In section 3 the competitive situation in Turkey’s mobile telecommunications 
market is described, before the empirical analysis (including a description of the data used) is 
presented in section 4. Section 5 summarises the results and concludes. 
 
2. Brief Review of Empirical Studies on Mobile Demand Elasticities 
Empirical studies on demand elasticities for mobile telecommunications markets have, in 
principle, used two different approaches. While the first approach is based on highly 
aggregated data on country or regional level, a second method to measure price elasticities 
relies on individual or survey data of consumer behaviour. Independently of whether 
aggregate or individual data has been used, most studies of mobile demand elasticities have 
found relatively moderate price elasticities. 
In one of the first empirical studies, Hausman (1999) found a price elasticity of access to 
mobile services of -0.51, using aggregate data on 30 U.S. markets for the period 1988 to 
1993. Analysing the price elasticity of subscription using data on 64 different countries, Ahn 
and Lee (1999) estimated an average subscription price elasticity of -0.36. In 2003, the UK 
Competition Commission (2003) reported own-price elasticities of mobile subscriptions 
between -0.08 and -0.54, summarising the results from different studies by DotEcon, Frontier 
Economics and Holden Pearmain. For mobile calls, own-price elasticities between -0.48 and -
0.62 were measured. In a study on the Australian mobile market, Access Economics reports a 
price elasticity of -0.8 (UK Competition Commission, 2003). Rodini, Ward, and Woroch 
(2003) analysed the fixed and mobile telecommunications access in the U.S. and, for this 
purpose, estimated both own and cross-price elasticities. Using survey data on telephony 
services, their study found own-price elasticities of -0.43 for mobile subscription rates. 
Furthermore, a total elasticity of -0.6 was estimated for the access and usage price. 
A rather different approach to analyse conduct in mobile markets was chosen by Parker and 
Röller (1997) and Grzybowski (2008), who both applied structural models in order to 
examine the competitive behaviour of mobile operators. While Parker and Röller (1997) 
found an own-price elasticity of -2.5, using data on the United States covering the period from 
1984 to 1988, Grzybowski (2008) found rather moderate elasticities for the EU countries 
between 1998 and 2002, ranging from -0.2 to -0.9. Tischler, Venture, and Walters (2001) 
estimated the mobile demand elasticity in Israel to be -0.8. Results in a similar range were   4
reported by the New Zealand Commerce Commission (2003) and by Manfrim and da Silva 
(2007) for a number of additional studies. 
More recently, Dewenter and Haucap (2008) analysed price elasticities in the Austrian market 
for mobile telecommunications services, using data on firm specific tariffs over the period 
from January 1998 to March 2002. Their study was the first to use dynamic panel data 
regressions to estimate short-run and long-run demand elasticities for business customers and 
for private consumers with both post-paid contracts and pre-paid cards. They found that 
business customers have a higher long-run elasticity of demand (-0.74) than private 
consumers (-0.37), where post-paid customers tend to have a higher long-run demand 
elasticity (-0.67) than pre-paid customers (-0.20). In addition, their paper also provided 
estimates for firm-specific demand elasticities in the range from -0.47 to -1.1. 
Another issue in the empirical analysis on telecommunications markets is the relation between 
fixed and mobile telecommunications, which has been one of the subjects of empirical 
telecommunications research more recently. The key question is whether fixed-line and 
mobile telecommunications services are substitutes or complements. Due to technological 
progress mobile network costs have decreased while the quality of mobile telecom-
munications services has increased so that mobile networks have started to become 
competitive vis-à-vis fixed-line networks. The studies that analyse fixed-mobile substitution 
do not have unambiguous results but rather vary with the definition of mobile demand 
(penetration or traffic) and the countries analysed (emerging and developed countries). For 
example, Gruber and Verboven (2001) find that the availability of fixed-line networks has a 
negative effect on the diffusion of mobile telephones in the European Union, whereas a 
positive correlation is found for Central and Eastern European countries by Gruber (2001). In 
a recent study, based on data from 1997 through 2004, Mao, Tsaib, and Chen (2008) argue 
that different substitution effects can be observed in different economies. While in more 
developed countries substitution is mainly taking the form of “traffic substitution”, a 
“penetration substitution” can be observed in emerging economies, due to the importance and 
magnitude of income effects.  
The study by Rodini, Ward, and Woroch (2003) mentioned above estimates the 
substitutability of fixed and mobile services for telecommunications access using a household 
survey conducted over the period 2000–2001 in the U.S. They find that the cross-price 
elasticity of fixed access price on mobile demand is positive and statistically significant (0.18 
for 2000 and 0.13 for 2001) and conclude that second fixed line and mobile services are   5
substitutes for one another. In yet another study, Madden, Coble-Neal, and Danzel (2004) 
analyse traffic demand and subscription separately and find that the development of fixed 
lines has a positive effect on the diffusion of mobile telecommunications, albeit the cross-
price elasticity is positive which suggests that the two services are substitutes. 
In order to analyse the demand elasticities for the Turkish mobile telecommunications market, 
this paper uses dynamic panel data models including instrumental variable techniques, which 
facilitate the calculation of short-run as well as long-run elasticities. In contrast to most other 
existing studies, firm level data is used for the five different mobile operators which have 
been active over various times in the Turkish mobile telecommunications market between 
January 2002 and December 2006. The data was derived from the incumbent fixed line 
network operator that supplies more than 90% of the fixed line traffic in Turkey. The five 
mobile telecommunications operators cover the entire market in Turkey, although not all of 
them were continuously operating during the period. While Turkcell and Telsim (today: 
Vodafone Türkiye) were active in the market since 1994, Aria and Aycell only entered in 
2001 and merged to form a joint operator, Avea, in 2003, which then left the market in a 
three-player oligopoly structure. 
The analysis presented firstly differs from other studies because data on firm specific tariffs is 
used and, secondly, because dynamic panel techniques are applied. Hence, one can 
distinguish between short-run and long-run demand elasticities. Furthermore, instrumental 
variable techniques are applied to avoid endogeneity bias. Hence, the study presented here is 
not only the first quantitative study of Turkey’s mobile telecommunications market, but a 
unique and innovative feature of the study is also the joint control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, persistence of mobile traffic over time, and endogeneity bias based on firm-
level data. 
Before the empirical analysis is presented, the Turkish market for mobile telecommunications 
services is briefly described in the following section. 
 
3. Overview of Turkish Telecommunication Markets 
The Turkish market for mobile telecommunications has remained one of the most concen-
trated markets in Europe (Atiyas & Dogan, 2007). While Turkcell and Vodafone Türkiye 
(previously: Telsim) have offered GSM mobile telephone services since 1994, further market   6
entry did not occur until 2001 when Aria (a consortium of Italian TIM and Turkish ISBANK) 
and Aycell (a Turk Telekom affiliate) entered the market.  
During the duopoly period from 1994 to 2001, Turkcell managed to keep the majority of the 
market. This is at least partly due to the fact that the operations of Telsim were suspended 
between November 1995 and June 1996 due to a managerial fraud concerning a profit sharing 
agreement with the Turkish Treasury. The incidents let suspicions grow about the financial 
viability of Telsim’s services so that Turkcell managed to regain significant market shares 
between 1995 and 1996. While Telsim had regained a market share of 31.5% in 1998, it lost 
market share again after two additional firms, namely Aria and Aycell, entered the market 
after a controversial government auction
1 of additional spectrum licenses in 2001. 
 
Table 1. Market Shares of Mobile Telecommunication Networks in Turkey 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006    2007
Turkcell  78 68 80  76.9  68.5 69.2 69 67  67.3 67.9 67 63 60 58 
Telsim  22  32  20 23.1  31.5 30.8 31 29.2 25.4 19.6 19 20.5  22.5 26 
Aria  - - - - - - -  2.7  5.1  - - - -  
Aycell  - - - - - - -  1.1  2.1  - - - -  
Avea  - - - - - - - - -  12.5 14  16.5  17.5  16 
Source: Telecommunications Authority of Turkey 
 
The two entrants faced a rather difficult economic environment, as a result of a severe 
financial crisis in Turkey which led to a 10% decrease in GDP and an according decrease of 
total demand. In addition, the two entrants also entered a rather hostile regulatory terrain. As 
Atiyas and Dogan (2007) convincingly argued the Turkish telecommunications regulator 
failed to facilitate effective competition, as it did not manage to implement effective roaming 
                                                 
1 This auction was described as a “fiasco” by Binmore and Klemperer (2002, p. 93) because “the Turkish 
government auctioned two licenses sequentially, but set the reserve price for the second license equal to the price 
at which the first license was sold. One company then bid much more for the first license than the market 
thought it could be worth if the company had to compete with a rival holding the second license. But the 
company had rightly figured that no rival would be willing to bid that high for the second license, which 
therefore remained unsold, leaving the company without a rival operating the second license.” Subsequently, the 
Turkish government made arrangements for a new sale of the unsold license. Also see Atiyas and Dogan (2007, 
p. 506) for a similar view.   7
and interconnection policies, even though both the government and the regulator favoured the 
new entrants. In a nutshell, the roaming obligations that were imposed on incumbents proved 
ineffective as the incumbents used legal tactics to significantly delay the implementation 
process. And the interconnection rates were set by the incumbents at a rather high level which 
the entrants did not challenge. This alone may have been harmless if the high termination 
rates had not been paired with significant off-net/on-net price differences that were used to 
discipline entrants, as also described extensively by Atiyas and Dogan (2007).  
As in many other emerging economies, the significant price differences between on-net and 
off-net prices have led many consumers to hold multiple SIM cards of different operators. In 
fact, the incidence of multiple SIM ownership has been common in many emerging markets 
for quite some time due to the large difference between on-net and off-net tariffs.
2 For a third 
and fourth entrant, however, it has proved difficult to enter the market and to gain significant 
market shares under these circumstances (see Table 1). It may be interesting to report, though, 
that Vodafone Turkey’s General Manager, Serpil Timuray, has recently stated in an interview 
that the percentage of multiple SIM card holders has now declined to some 20% (June 2009), 
while it was still at 29% in November 2008, and even higher before.
3 According to market 
participants, the main reason for multiple SIM card utilisation now to decline is the recent 
introduction of new cross-network compatible tariffs served by operators. Multiple SIM users 
now apparently tend to discard extra cards in favour of one operator now.
4  
The third crucial barrier to entry and to growth for new entrants has been the lack of mobile 
number portability, inducing significant switching costs for consumers when leaving an 
incumbent for a new entrant (Buehler & Haucap, 2004). It may be noted though that this 
situation is now remedied for mobile number portability was implemented in 2008. 
Given the lack of mobile number portability and ineffective roaming and interconnection 
policies, paired with significant differences between on-net and off-net prices, the two 
entrants did not manage to make a major inroad into the Turkish mobile telecommunications 
markets during their first two years. Therefore, the two firms decided to merge in 2003 to 
form a new entity called Avea (also see Table 1). 
The aim of this paper is not to replicate the thorough analysis of Atiyas and Dogan (2007), 
who have examined the lack of competition and its reasons in the Turkish market for mobile 
                                                 
2 See http://www.telecomspricing.co.uk/news_detail.cfm?item=18  
3 See http://www.turk.internet.com/portal/yazigoster.php?yaziid=25113  
4 See http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL559514420090805    8
telecommunications services. The present paper rather wants to complement that analysis now 
with econometric evidence about the Turkish mobile telecommunications market. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Data and Model Specification  
In order to analyze the demand structure of Turkish mobile telecommunications markets, 
monthly data for the five different firms mentioned above is used over the period from 
January 2002 to December 2006. The data on mobile traffic, prices, and networks’ subscriber 
bases has been provided by the Turkish Telecommunications Authority (TA). Definitions of 
the relevant variables and descriptive statistics can be found in Tables A1-A4 in the appendix.  
The quantity variable (mobile traffic), as the starting point for estimating demand equations 
and calculating price elasticities, is out-going off-net traffic per subscriber of the respective 
mobile networks. The reason for not including on-net traffic into the empirical analysis is that 
competitive forces in Turkey drove network operators to subsidize on-net calls to an extent 
that on-net calls were effectively free of charge. As information on the detailed traffic 
structure for on-net calls was not available, the quantities for which consumers were not 
charged, have not been used in the analysis. While mobile markets are characterized by price 
differentiation among different consumer groups, standard tariffs that discriminate only 
between on-net and off-net calls are used, as more detailed data has not been available.  
In order to estimate own price elasticities and cross price elasticities regarding fixed line 
tariffs, regressions are first conducted for the aggregate market. In addition, separate estimates 
are provided for different segments of the Turkish mobile telecommunications market in a 
second regression analysis. The intuition underlying this disaggregation is that different 
market segments, namely pre-paid and post-paid customers, are usually characterized by 
different demand characteristics. In the analysis presented in this paper, the variable “total 
number of outgoing off-net minutes” measures the monthly off-net traffic (Q) for pre-paid 
and post-paid customers. Furthermore, in order to cover the demand growth that results from 
network effects and the construction and extension of new networks, the average outgoing 
off-net minutes per subscriber (q) are constructed for each network within a given market. 
The off-net tariff for fixed line networks has been used as explanatory variables along with 
population and GDP per capita. In addition, a linear time trend has been included to capture   9
the effect of technological progress. All price variables have been deflated by the Turkish 
consumer price index to obtain real prices. 
A standard approach for the estimation of demand elasticities in telecommunications is 
derived from the so-called Houthakker-Taylor model, which takes possible path dependencies 
of consumption into account (Houthakker & Taylor, 1970). For these reasons long-run 
elasticities are expected to differ from short-run elasticities, as consumers may only react with 
some time lag. If consumers’ calling behaviour is shaped by habits and routines, demand is 
expected to be more elastic in the long-run when consumers change their consumption 
patterns. According to the Houthakker-Taylor model, demand q at time t can be expressed as  
1 tt t qq p
 
  , 
or, taking logarithms of both sides, as 
1, ln ln ln ln . it i it j jt k it k it
jk
qqp x           , 
where  it q is the average quantity demanded for tariff i at time t,  jt p  is the respective average 
price for the firm under consideration (j = i). Furthermore,  , it k x ’s are k additional explanatory 
variables,  it  is an error term, and β, the  j   ’s and the  k  ’s are the parameters to be estimated.  
 
4.2. Model Identification and Results  
In order to estimate dynamic panel data models the Arellano-Bond-Estimator is used, due to 
endogeneity problems with respect to the lagged dependent variable and prices. Following 
Arellano and Bond (1991), the second lag of traffic per capita is used as an instrument for the 
lagged dependent variable. In addition, wages are used as instruments and several cost shifters 
are included in the set of instrumental variables. These instruments include the real interest 
rate, the telecommunications equipment price index, the number of base stations, and the 
price index for services in Turkey. These cost shifters are used as instruments because they 
have a direct effect on endogenous price variables, but not a direct effect on 
telecommunications traffic
5. In the following, results are first presented for the aggregate 
Turkish mobile telecommunications market, before separate estimations for pre-paid and 
post-paid customers are discussed.  
                                                 
5 See Kaiser and Wright (2006) for further discussion of this kind of instrumental variables.   10
Table 2. Estimation Results for the Entire Market 
Outgoing traffic per capita  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
Outgoing traffic per capita-1  0.701*** 0.075 
Mobile off-net tariff  -0.277***  0.074 
Fixed-line off-net tariff  0.256***  0.099 
Population 73.810  184.358 
GDP per capita  0.157**  0.078 
Time -0.092  0.233 
Obs. 332  - 
R
2  0.62 - 
Hansen J statistic  6.637  Prob. 0.249 
Weak identification test
#  16.352  Less than 5% maximal IV relative 
bias 
***, **, * statistically significant on the 1, 5, and 10% level, 
# maximal relative IV bias obtained from critical 
values in Stock and Yogo (2005), standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. 
 
Table 2 presents the regression results for the aggregate Turkish mobile telecommunications 
market. The Hansen J statistic indicates that the regression does not suffer from over-
identification problems. Furthermore, the weak identification test (Kleibergen & Paap, 2006) 
shows that the maximal relative IV bias is less than 5%.
6 Weak identification tests based on 
Stock and Yogo (2005) are applied because standard rules of thumb following Bound, Jaeger, 
and Baker (1995) only work in the case of one endogenous variable, while they are not 
appropriate in the case of several endogenous explanatory variables. All coefficients have the 
expected signs. The cross price elasticity of mobile telecommunications traffic with regard to 
fixed-line call prices is positive, whereas the own price elasticity of mobile traffic is negative 
with a value of -0.28, which is in line with the previous studies reported in section 2. 
 
Table 3 and 4 present separate results for pre-paid and post-paid mobile telecommunications 
markets. One should expect that the demand functions for different market segments are 
                                                 
6 The weak identification test is based on critical values obtained from Stock and Yogo (2005) and the 
generalized reduced rank test from Kleibergen and Paap (2006).   11
largely independent from each other, even though the cost shocks may affect the markets 
similarly. In contrast to most countries in Western Europe, the number of pre-paid consumers 
in Turkey is growing faster than the number of post-paid customers, where pre-paid 
consumers are covering 80% of the market. Furthermore, high interconnection rates, which 
induce major differences between on-net and off-net calling prices, are likely to be an 
important factor. As reported in section 3, a significant number of consumers multi-homes in 
order to benefit from discounted on-net calling rates. Under the assumption that a large share 
of post-paid subscribers are business customers, it is reasonable to assume that multi-homers 
are mostly pre-paid consumers who are attracted by special marketing strategies that focus on 
discounts for on-net communication. 
 
Table 3. Estimation Results for the Pre-paid Market 
Outgoing traffic per capita  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
Outgoing traffic per capita-1  0.727*** 0.080 
Mobile off-net tariff  -0.356***  0.082 
Fixed-line off-net tariff  0.331**  0.146 
Population -177.119  260.985 
GDP per capita  0.273***  0.081 
Time 0.225 0.331 
Obs. 164  - 
R
2  0.80 - 
Hansen J statistic  9.923  Prob. 0.128 
Weak identification test
#  11.060  Less than 10% maximal IV relative 
bias 
***, **, * statistically significant on the 1, 5, and 10% level, 
# maximal relative IV bias obtained from critical 
values in Stock and Yogo (2005), standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. 
 
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the pre-paid market. The own price elasticity is 
considerably lower than the aggregate market elasticity reported in Table 2. This result also 
holds for the cross-price elasticity of fixed line services which is significant at the 5%-level   12
and has a value of 0.33. That suggests that fixed-line telephony and mobile telephony are 
substitutes for pre-paid customers. 
The diagnostic checks exhibit similar results as for the estimation of the aggregate market 
demand. This suggests that the overall fit is reasonably good and the IV bias is less than 10% 
compared to OLS estimations. The null hypothesis of over-identification is also rejected. 
 
Table 4. Estimation Results for the Post-paid Market 
Outgoing traffic per capita  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
Outgoing traffic per capita-1  0.658*** 0.192 
Mobile off-net tariff  -0.202*  0.117 
Fixed-line off-net tariff  0.169  0.123 
Population 357.329  315.094 
GDP per capita  0.057  0.164 
Time -0.451  0.398 
Obs. 165  - 
R
2  0.25 - 
Hansen J statistic  7.162  Prob. 0.306 
Weak identification test
#  4.621  Less than 30% maximal IV relative 
bias 
***, **, * statistically significant on the 1, 5, and 10% level, 
# maximal relative IV bias obtained from critical 
values in Stock and Yogo (2005), standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. 
 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the post-paid market. As in the previous 
estimations, all coefficients have the expected signs but the effects are significantly weaker. 
One also has to mention that the IV bias is considerably larger than in the regressions for the 
whole and the pre-paid market, but it is still acceptable low. The own price elasticity in the 
post-paid market is smaller as its counterpart in the pre-paid market and as a consequence, 
even smaller as in the whole market. One reason for this observation may be that there are 
most likely more business customers on post-paid contracts. Under the (reasonable) 
assumption that business customers are mainly post-paid customers the price elasticity of 
demand may be smaller compared to other consumers for at least three reasons. Firstly,   13
business customers may find it more difficult to avoid or to postpone business calls than 
private customers. Secondly, employees using their business mobile phone may care less 
about the actual price than private consumers, as the company may be paying their phone 
expenditures. And thirdly, business customers may be less likely to multi-home (i.e., to hold 
multiple SIM cards of alternative operators) if they enter into exclusive contracts with one 
particular operator. In this case, they cannot use an alternative SIM card to place an on-net 
call instead of an off-net call, i.e. it is more difficult to avoid off-net calls for business 
customers so that their demand elasticity for off-net calls should be lower. Finally, pre-paid 
consumers (which may be assumed to include students and younger people) may be more 
price-sensitive because they may have a lower income. 
Also note that, in contrast to pre-paid customers, the cross-price elasticity is not significant for 
post-paid customers (even though it has a positive sign). This suggests that fixed-line and 
mobile telecommunications services are more difficult to substitute for post-paid customers. 
Assuming again that business customers are rather on post-paid than on pre-paid tariffs, it is 
understandable that fixed-line and mobile calls are more difficult to substitute as calls may be 
more difficult to postpone and both services may be needed. 
The Houthakker-Taylor model also allows for a distinction between short-run and long-run 
elasticities. Note from the Houthakker-Taylor model that current demand can be expressed as 
1 tt t qq p
 
  . The short-run price elasticity is determined by  , whereas the long-run price 
elasticity equals   1    . Table 5 compares short-run and long-run elasticities for both the 
aggregate market and for pre-paid and post-paid markets separately. 
 
Table 5: Short-Run and Long-Run Elasticities 
  Entire Market  Prepaid Market Postpaid  Market 
Short-run  elasticity  -0.28 -0.36 -0.20 
Long-run  elasticity  -0.45 -0.33 -0.72 
 
As may be expected, short-run elasticities are smaller in the post-paid market. This 
observation is quite intuitive, as post-paid customers usually have contracts lasting over a 
given period of time (e.g., two years). Hence, it may take some time to change one’s 
behaviour as one may have to change its contracts which takes some time. In contrast, pre-
paid customers are usually quite flexible to switch between mobile telecommunications   14
providers in the short-run, especially if they multi-home by holding multiple SIM cards. 
Hence, it is not surprising that there is no significant difference between the short-run and the 
long-run elasticity for pre-paid customers. 
It may also be interesting to note at this point that, in their study of the Austrian mobile 
telecommunications market, Dewenter and Haucap (2008) found that Austrian business 
customers have a higher long-run elasticity of demand (-0.74) than private consumers (-0.37) 
and that post-paid customers tend to have a higher long-run demand elasticity (-0.67) than 
pre-paid customers (-0.20). These results are astonishingly similar to the results for Turkey 
presented in this paper. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has analyzed the demand for mobile telecommunications services in Turkey. 
Dynamic panel data techniques have been applied in order to estimate short- and long-run 
price elasticities, as well as fixed network substitution. The study presented here is the first 
econometric analysis of the growing mobile telecommunications sector in Turkey, using firm 
level data of five competitors, covering two market segments (pre-paid and post-paid) 
between January 2002 and December 2006.  
The results suggest that pre-paid consumers have a more elastic demand than post-paid 
consumers. One of the reasons may possibly be that institutional and business groups are 
more likely to be on post-paid contracts. These customers may find it more difficult to avoid 
or to postpone business calls than private customers. Moreover, employees using their 
business mobile phone may care less about the actual price than private consumers, as the 
company may be paying their phone bill. In addition, business customers may be less likely to 
multi-home (i.e., to hold multiple SIM cards of alternative operators) if they enter into 
exclusive contracts with one particular operator. In this case, they cannot use an alternative 
SIM card to place an on-net call instead of an off-net call, i.e. it is more difficult to avoid off-
net calls for business customers so that their demand elasticity for off-net calls should be 
lower. And finally, pre-paid consumers (which may be assumed to include students and 
younger people) may be more price-sensitive because they may have a lower income. 
In contrast to pre-paid customers, the cross-price elasticity between fixed-line prices and 
mobile traffic is not significant for post-paid customers. This suggests that fixed-line and 
mobile telecommunications services are more difficult to substitute for post-paid customers   15
than for pre-paid customers. Assuming again that business customers are rather on post-paid 
than on pre-paid tariffs, it is understandable that fixed-line and mobile calls are more difficult 
to substitute for these consumer groups as calls may be more difficult to postpone and both 
services may be needed for them. 
As may be expected, short-run elasticities are smaller in the post-paid market. This 
observation is quite intuitive because post-paid customers usually have contracts lasting over 
a given period of time (e.g., two years). Hence, it may take some time to change one’s 
behaviour as one may have to change its contracts which takes some time. In contrast, pre-
paid customers are usually also quite flexible to switch between mobile telecommunications 
providers in the short-run, especially if the multi-home by holding multiple SIM cards. Hence, 
it is not surprising that there is no significant difference between the short-run and the long-
run elasticity for pre-paid customers. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Description of Variables in the Dataset for the Aggregate Market 
Variable Description 
Logarithm of outgoing traffic per capita  Logarithm of average outgoing traffic per capita on 
provider base for the whole mobile 
telecommunications market. 
Logarithm mobile off-net tariff  Logarithm  of tariff for mobile off-net calls in the 
whole telecommunications market on providers base. 
Logarithm  fixed-line  tariff  Logarithm of average fixed line tariff of Turk 
Telecom. 
Logarithm real interest rate  Logarithm of the real interest rate in Turkey. 
Logarithm price index for services  Logarithm of the Turkish service price index. 
Logarithm telecommunications equipment price index  Logarithm  of  the  Turkish  telecommunications 
equipment price index. 
Logarithm wage index  Logarithm of the wage index in Turkey. 
Dummy variable for holidays (June. July, and August)  Dummy variable signalling the summer months during 
which most countries usually have summer holidays. 
Logarithm number of base stations  Logarithm of the number of base stations in Turkey. 
Logarithm Turkish population  Logarithm of the Turkish population. 
Logarithm GDP per capita  Logarithm of GDP per capita in Turkey. 
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics for the Aggregate Market Dataset 
Variable Observations  Mean  Min  Max 
Logarithm of 
outgoing traffic per 
capita mobile 
356 2.50  0.76  4.51 
Logarithm mobile 
off-net tariff 
412 4.76  3.37  5.42 
Logarithm fixed-line 
tariff 
600 4.84  4.26  5.13 
Logarithm real 
interest rate 
600 3.34  2.76  4.10 
Logarithm price 
index for services 





600 4.44  4.15  4.64 
Logarithm wage 
index 
600 7.15  6.70  7.46 
Dummy variable for 
holidays (June. July, 
and August) 
600 0.25  0  1 
Logarithm Turkish 
population 
600 18.08  18.04  18.12 
Logarithm GDP per 
capita 
600 5.06  4.66  5.39 
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Table A3: Description of Variables in the Pre-paid/Post-paid Market Dataset 
Variable Description 
Logarithm of outgoing traffic per capita pre-paid   Logarithm of average outgoing traffic per capita on 
provider base for the pre-paid market. 
Logarithm of outgoing traffic post-paid   Logarithm of average outgoing traffic per capita on 
provider base for the post-paid market. 
Logarithm mobile off-net tariff pre-paid   Logarithm of tariff for mobile off-net calls in the pre-
paid market. 
Logarithm mobile off-net tariff post-paid   Logarithm of tariff for mobile off-net calls in the post-
paid market. 
Logarithm  fixed-line  tariff  Logarithm of average fixed line tariff of Turk 
Telecom. 
Logarithm real interest rate  Logarithm of the real interest rate in Turkey. 
Logarithm price index for services  Logarithm of the Turkish service price index. 
Logarithm telecommunications equipment price index  Logarithm  of  the  Turkish  telecommunications 
equipment price index. 
Logarithm wage index  Logarithm of the wage index in Turkey. 
Dummy variable for holidays (June. July, and August)  Dummy variable signalling the summer months during 
which most countries usually have summer holidays. 
Logarithm number of base stations  Logarithm of the number of base stations in Turkey. 
Logarithm Turkish population  Logarithm of the Turkish Population. 
Logarithm GDP per capita  Logarithm of GDP per capita in Turkey. 
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Table A4: Descriptive Statistics for the Pre-paid/Post-paid Market Dataset 
Variable Observations  Mean  Min  Max 
Logarithm of 
outgoing traffic per 
capita pre-paid  












206 4.59  3.37  5.29 
Logarithm fixed-line 
tariff 
300 4.84  4.26  5.13 
Logarithm real 
interest rate 
300 3.39  2.76  4.10 
Logarithm price 
index for services 





300 4.44  4.15  4.64 
Logarithm wage 
index 
300 7.15  6.70  7.46 
Dummy variable for 
holidays (June. July, 
and August) 
300 0.25  0  1 
Logarithm number 
of base stations 
204 8.45  6.75  9.36 
Logarithm Turkish 
population 
300 18.08  18.05  18.12 
Logarithm GDP per 
capita 
300 5.06  4.66  5.39 
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